Operation "Whitehot" - Creation of the Churchill Mark Na75

Excerpt Two

In addition to being under gunned, the gun mounting in the Churchill turret had an inside ‘mantlet’ – the gun and coaxial Besa machine gun protruded through a large square hole in the front of the turret, the inside of the tank being protected by a slab of armour riding in slots and rising and falling as the gun was elevated and depressed. Although this arrangement afforded a degree of protection, it was anything but impervious to machine gun ‘splash’, and being situated some 8 inches or so behind the front face of the turret, in the bright light and shadow of North Africa, it showed up as a distinct black patch on the front of the turret. 1 This patch was, for the German gunners, a convenient aiming mark, and it is a fact that some 60% of the Churchill casualties in the Medjerda Valley battles, were hit on or around the mantlet. 2

It was not surprising therefore, that in spite of the attraction of heavier armour, the Army Commanders and indeed many of the armoured formations themselves preferred the more lightly armoured American Sherman because of it’s 75mm gun with it’s range of 7,000 odd yards, and an outside mantlet which cast no inconvenient shadow.

After the fall of Tunis, the two brigades were withdrawn, together with their supporting troops to the area around Bona, where they were to sit for almost a year whilst the rest of the 1st and 8th Armies went off to Sicily and Italy 3 to get on with the war.

The frustration level was high, and continuous exercises and war games did little to dispel this – the brigades which had put up a terrific show in North Africa felt that the war had passed them by. Montgomery 4 had little use in his current tasks for a tank which had to approach so close to the enemy before it could inflict any damage, that the enemy gunners could wait literally until they could see the “whites of it’s eyes, or at least the black patch on it’s turret”, before picking it off at will."

1.It is a myth that German gunners took specific aim at the a Churchill's mantlet.
2. 60%?
3. The 1st Army did not go to Sicily, it was disbanded shortly after the end of the Tunisian Campaign.
4. Being an infantry man, regrettably, Montgomery completely ignored the lessons that he could have learned and continued to belittle the Churchill even to the extent of saying so to the Prime Minister. Looking back, pique on Monty's part probably had a lot to do with it. Prior to the final stages of the campaign, in a signal to Alexander verging on impertinence he wrote, as recorded by General Sir William Jackson:

"I suggest a decision is required as to who plays the major part in the final assaults on the enemy's last positions, There seems to be two alternatives: A. Eighth Army does it. In this case I must move forward using all my divisions and face up to a real battle on the Enfidaville position. In this case I would have to have at my disposal all the resources in Northern Tunisia.

B. First Army does it. In this case I could sit tight and merely exert pressure. On no account must we split our effort and launch two or more thrusts none of which can be sustained. Presumably you will decide if it is to be A or B.

Alexander's response was short and very much to the point.
"Main effort in the next phase will be by First Army. Preparations already well advanced for attack earliest date 22 April. Most suitable area for deployment armour is in the plain west of Tunis so require 1 Armoured Div and 7 Armoured C Regt to join IX Corps [1st Army] from you as early as can be arranged, Hope you can develop maximum pressure against Enfidaville position to fit in with First Army attack."

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