Introductory
1. This account of operations of the 25th Tank Brigade (Brigadier J.N.Tetley DS0, TD) covers the period 20 September to 6 October 1944. The Brigade was still deployed on a two corps’ front, although on 25 September orders were received for the brigade less the 142nd Regiment Royal Armoured Corps to come wider command 5 Corps, and on 29 September the 142nd Regiment Royal Armoured Corps was released from the 46th Division and returned to under command 25th Tank Brigade. However, the rest which was anticipated on this move was not forthcoming as on 26 September, the North Irish Horse were warned to be prepared to move to under command 10th Indian Division, moving there on 1 October and taking part in operations preparatory to crossing the River Fiumicino.
2. In the operations preceding the release of the brigade all three regiments, with the 142nd Army Field Regiment RA (Royal Devon Yeomanry) giving artillery support for the tanks, continued to support the infantry in battles which were hampered to some extent by the weather which was beginning to break into the autumn rains, On 20 September the 51 Royal Tanks attempted an armourod break through to the River Marecchia in an endeavour to rush the river before the rains come and made it impassable. The enemy, however, was in strength with heavy armour and anti-tank weapons, and although the operation hustled the enemy and caused him to abandon some of his guns, the main objective was not achieved, On 22 September two troops of the North Irish Horse passed across the river with the 28th Infantry Brigade to form a bridgehead through which passed the 5th Canadian Armoured Division. The 142nd Regiment Royal Armoured Corps, still experiencing heavy going owing to ground conditions, attempted to cross the Marecchia on 23 September but met fierce anti-tank fire and it was not until the following day that they were able to cross and continued to support the advance of the division until released.
3. During the period 1 to 30 September the intensity of the fighting may be judged from the fact that the brigade had forty-two tanks knocked out of which sixteen were total casualties.
General Situation (1)
4. The enemy had been ousted from his strong defensive positions on the Coriano and Gemmano ridges and was back across the Conca. On the right the 1st Canadian Infantry Division had made considerable progress but the enemy refused to be daunted by this and continued to offer strong resistance to the 4th British Division. The River Ausa was the next to be crossed so that the San Fortunato feature, which dominated the flat coastal strip to Rimini, could be assaulted. Progress on 5 Corps front had continued only after very heavy and bitter fighting at Monte Gridolfo, Gemmano and Montesoudo. On this sector, as on the sector of 1 Canadian Corp every endeavour was being made to continue so that the wide River Marrechia could be crossed before the weather which was very uncertain, broke with the autumn rains end so prevent an advance into the Po plain.
Own Troops
5. The 25th Tank Brigade continued to support 4th British Division and 146th Division, although at the end of September the North Irish Horse was placed under command of 10th Indian Division which came in on the 5 Corps sector. The 4th British Infantry Division was disbanded and provided reinforcements for other divisions while the 4th Indian Division also left 5 Corps.
Enemy
6. There was little change in the line up on the German side, except that the 356th Division had come from north of Florence to bolster the badly depleted 98th Division and the 26th Pannzcr Division had been withdrawn to be replaced by the 20th German Air Force Division. Units of the 162th (Turcoman) Division had also been committed.
Terrain
7. The country continued similar to that over which the preceding operations had been fought, with still more rivers to cross and likely to become more difficult with the deterioration of the weather.
Operations in support of 4th British Division under command 1st Canadian Corps.
Planning
8. The North Irish Horse and the 51st Royal Tanks continued to support the 4th British Division under command 1 Canadian Corps. Considerable progress had been made on the right by the 1st Canadian Infantry Division, and it was appreciated, not very accurately as events subsequently showed, that this would force the enemy in the 4th British Division front to withdraw, but once again the Germans demonstrated their remarkable tenacity and remained firm. 1 Canadian Corps plan was for the 1st Canadian Infantry Division on the right, supported by the 21st Tank Brigade to establish a bridgehead over the River Ausa and capture the dominating San Fortunato feature; 4th British Division on the night 19/20 September were to begin a two phase attack. Phase one, a night attack with two companies of the 1st/6th Surreys to capture Point 113 (812929) with two troops of ‘B’ Squadron supporting them from first light, ‘H’ hour for the attack being 2300 hours. Phase two of this attack entailed the capture of Point 97 (817923) by one company of the 1st/6th Surreys supported by the remaining two troops of’ ‘B’ Squadron, 51st Royal Tanks. Both the features were situated on the San Fortunato ridge.
The Attaok towards the Marecchia
9. By 0100 hours 20 September the infantry were reported on their objective in Phase one, but machine gun fire was still directed on them and there was sounds of considerable movement around them. A request was therefore made for the tanks to go forward to them immediately. The tanks moved forward to the area Sant’ Aquilina (8292) in order to get up the steep ascent to the infantry at first light. At 0345 hours the tanks commenced their hazardous climb up a route marked by the infantry with white tapes. The tapes proved an invaluable guide to the tanks, but unfortunately they did not reach fully to the infantry positions, and upon reaching the limit of the tapes it was impossible for them to see the infantry owing to the darkness, The Squadron Second-in-Command accordingly went forward on foot to endeavour to contact them, but unfortunately in his Royal Armoured Corps type steel helmet he was mistaken for a German and shot in the chest by our own infantry. Despite this misfortune the infantry were contacted by first light and the tanks were able to give valuable support in shooting up enemy trying to escape from Point 113, at 0500 hours Phase two commenced on arrival in the area of the road junction 88929 the tanks came under armour-piercing shellfire from the right flank, which at first was thought to coming from the tanks of the 21st Tank Brigade supporting the 1st Canadian Division and who had mistaken our forward tanks for enemy, or from a troop of M.10s which had wandered from the fold. Happily this was not the case, and the enemy armour which was the actual cause of the fire, was eventually found and engaged by our artillery which effectively silenced it. The infantry and tanks were then able to proceed and capture the objective of Phase two.
(1) General Situation on 22 September
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