Chapter Five
6th - 21st October 1944

Introductory

1. This account of the operations of the 25th Tank Brigade, (Brigadier J.N. Tetley, D.S.O., T.D.) covers the period 6 - 21 October 1944, during which time the Brigade was in support of 5 Corps in the advance from the River Fiumicino to the River Savio. A feature of this phase was the very bad weather which prevailed, making tank movement at times practically impossible. The only regiment of the Brigade to be operationally committed was the North Irish Horse which was under command of the 10th Indian Division on the left of the 5 Corps sector. The 51st Battalion, Royal Tank Regiment and the 142nd Regiment Royal Armoured Corps were warned to be ready to support the 4th British Division, but did not move forward until 17 October and 21 October and the account, therefore, deals almost exclusively with the actions of North Irish Horse.

General Situation

2. 5 Corps was holding a sector in the hills south of, and inclusive of, Route 9, having closed up to the line of the River Fiumicino after the 10th Indian Division had cleared the important Sogliano Ridge and the village of Sogliano al Rubicone (R 6392). This river ran across the line of advance from its source in the hills near Sogliano, through the town of Savignano (M 7001) on Route 9 until finally entering the Adriatic at Gatteo a Mare (M 7510).

5 Corps Plan to Cross the Fiumicino (1)

3. 5 Corps plan, within the wider plan of Eighth Army, was to attack across the river in conjunction with 1 Canadian Corps on its right, advance to the River Savio which was the next river obstacle, and secure crossings across the latter in the area of, and south of, the town of Cesena (M 5907) which lies on Route 9. To carry out this plan the following objectives were defined:

First Objective - San Giovanni (M 6901) - Pt 188 (R 666988) - M. Gattona (R 6697) - Roncofreddo (R 6596).

Second Objective - Montiano (M 6400) - M. Spaccato (R 6296).

Third Objective - Cesena (M 5007) - river crossing south of the town in area M 5601.

Grouping

4. In order to achieve the above objectives, the following troops were available to 5 Corps:

Right - 56th Division with under command 7th Armoured Brigade (less 6th Royal Tanks)

Centre - 46th Division with under command 2nd Armourod Brigade.

Left - 10th Indian Division with under command: 43rd Gurkha Lorried Infantry Brigade.
North Irish Horse.
Central Indian Horse.

Reserve
4th British Division with under command: 25th Tank Brigade (less North Irish Horse)
12th Lancers
1st Assault Regiment Royal Armoured Corps/Royal Engineers.

The main thrust of the Corps was to be along the left flank of 16th Division and the right flank of 10th Indian Division, along a line approximately three thousand yards south of Route 9.

Timings

5. ‘D’ Day was timed for the night 6/7 October, but no improvement took place in the weather and the attack wa postponed for twenty-four hours. The postponement, however, did not affect the attack of the 10th Indian Division across the river to capture Monte Farneto (R 6194). This attack went in as originally planned and was successful.

Terrain

6. The terrain through which 5 Corps had to operate was difficult enough for operations by attacking forces when the weather was fine, but the continuous rain increased the difficulties a hundredfold. Immediately south of Route 9 the land is flat but thickly cultivated, making it very difficult for fighting. At distances varying from one mile onwards, the land begins to rise into the foothills of the Apennines, which run almost parallel with Route 9. Between the River Fiumicino and River Savio were several dominating features, the key one being Monte Farneto, The innumerable small villages were invariably set on the summits of hills and features so that the attacking forces must always move uphill. The enemy took full advantage of making these hills and features into strong defensive positions, and very bitter fighting occurred on the majority of them before they were finally cleared. He had good observation on the roads and river crossings, and possessed a considerable number of guns which he used persistently and accurately. Main roads south of Route 9 were practically non-existent, and much work was required on the secondary roads to keep them in good order. The heavy rain caused serious deterioration of the roads and at times tracked movement both on and off the roads was impossible.

(1) Map 9. Advance across the Fiumicino 7-10 October 1944

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