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The Enemy Situation.

7. Although recent fighting had not been exceptionally heavy owing to weather conditions, a steady drain had been imposed upon the enemy infantry, and this could not always be rapidly replaced. To offset this, however, the Germans had the advantage of the excellent defensive terrain, and also by the fact that they were falling back upon their dumps and thus shortening the lines of communication.

8. At the opening of this phase the enemy dispositions on the 5 Corps sector were as follows:

90th Panzer Grenadier Division - had the important task of defending Route 9, having 200th Grenadier Regiment (Motorised) up left and 361st Grenadier Regiment (Motorised) up right.

278th Infantry Division - was on the right of 90th Panzer Grenadier Division, south of Route 9 to, and. including Montegallo (R 6899).
992nd Grenadier Regiment and 994th Grenadier Regiment were both committed.

114th Jaeger Division this division was south of 278th Division and had 721st Jaeger Regiment left and 721st Jaeger Regiment right.
356th Infantry Division- was holding a very extended front south of 114th Jaeger Division, gradually curving westwards. 871st Grenadier Regiment was on the right of 721st Jaeger Regiment being responsible for the important Monte Farneto feature.

As the attack continued 114th Jaeger Division gradually moved northwards to the exclusion of 278th Division which was taken into reserve. 90th Panzer Grenadier Division eventually followed to form a mobile reserve, and by the time Cesena was reached 114th Jaeger Division was responsible for the town and Route 9, suffering heavily in its defence. 26th Panzer Division was then on its left opposing the advance of 1 Canadian Corps.

The Operations of the 25th Tank Brigade 6/21 October.

9. During this period the North Irish Horse, and 383rd Battery of 142nd Army Field Regiment Royal Artillery, were the only units of the Brigade to be actively engaged, being in support of 10th Indian Division. Although 4th British Division relieved 46th Division on the night 18/19 October and assisted in clearing the town of Cesena and the high ground to the south, the tanks of 51st Royal Tanks and 142nd Royal Armoured Corps, who were under command of the Division, were not engaged, but had moved forward ready to support the attacks over the River Savio, an operation which is dealt with in the succeeding chapter. The operations of the North Irish Horse are set out in Appendix ‘B’.

10. With the North Irish Horse supporting the operations of 10th Indian Division, the remainder of the brigade was placed under command 4th British Division to support the forthcoming operations of that Division, and placed under twenty-four hours notice to move forward. A slight improvement in the weather gave hopes that 51st Royal Tanks may be moved on 7 October and orders were given to that effect, but a further downpour occurred and the move postponed. Orders were, however, issued to 51st Royal Tanks and 142nd Royal Armoured Corps for the Commanding Officers and Squadron Leaders to contact 10th Infantry Brigade and 12th Infantry Brigade respectively, preparatory to forthcoming operations. (1) At this time Brigade Headquarters was harboured just off Route 16 between Cattohica (R 9986) and Rimini (R 8598), and Headquarters 4th British Division was located west of Rimini. In order to facilitate control, it was decided to move Brigade Headquarters to the vicinity of the Divisional Headquarters, and on 8 October this move was attempted. (1) Torrential rain, however, prevented any movement off the roads and the Brigade Headquarters had to return to its old location, which was then pretty well waterlogged. On 10 October the Brigade Headquarters moved into billets for the first time, the location being Rimini. On 17 October a further short spell of fine weather occurred and advantage was taken of this good fortune to move 142nd Royal Armoured Corps forward to Badia (M 6501), just south of Route 9. On the following day Brigade Headquarters moved to Montalbano (B 6998), south of Savignano.

11. The attack across the River Savio in which 142nd Royal Armoured Corps was to support 12th Infantry Brigade was planned for the night 20/21 October, and in preparation for this, extensive reconnaissances were carried out on night 19/20 October with tank and infantry personnel to find the most suitable crossing of the river. On 20 October a reconnaissance was also undertaken by an officer of 142nd Royal Armoured Corps and personnel of Squadron 1st Assault Regiment Royal Armoured Corps/Royal Engineers who were to be prepared to place an ‘Ark’ crossing in the Savio. (An ‘Ark’ is a turretless Churchill tank which normally carries hinged ramps at either end, which can be placed in a gap to bridge it up to between forty and fifty feet. Two or more ‘Arks’ may be used where the gap is too wide or too deep for one ‘Ark’).

12. On 20 October 51st Royal Tanks were also brought forward to Balignano (M 6701) also south of Route 9, to tie up with 10th Infantry Brigade and at the same time ‘A’ and ‘C’ Squadrons 142nd Royal Armoured Corps moved forward to the southwestern outskirts of Cesena, and final preparations made for the attack.

(1) 25th Tank Brigade Signal 0.1. dated 7 October 1944. Appendix ‘C'.

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