25th Tank Brigade

Narrative of Operations of the 25th Tank Brigade

Page Thirty-four

Appendix 'B'

1. Throughout the whole of the period under review North Irish Horse was under command of the 10th Indian Division which was composed as follows:-

10th Indian Infantry Brigade
   1st Durham Light Infantry
   4th/I0th Baluchs
   2nd/4th Gurkha Rifles
20th Indian Infantry Brigade
   1st/2nd Punjabs
   3rd/5th Mahrattas
   2nd/3rd Gurkha Rifles.
25th Indian Infantry Brigade
   1st King’s Own
   3rd/1st Punjabs
   3rd/10th Royal Garhwal Rifles
   Under Command:-
   43rd Gurkha Brigade Lorried Infantry Brigade
   2nd/6th Gurkha Rifles
   2nd/8th Gurkha Rifles
   2nd/10th Gurkha Rifles

The North Irish Horse was supported by 383rd Battery of 142nd Royal Field Regiment Royal Artillery (Royal Devonshire Yeomanry), the self-propelled gun regiment affiliated to 25th Tank Brigade, and also a section of the Brigade Troop Royal Engineers.
Plan of 10th Indian Division
2. The capture of Sogliano (R 6392) and the Sogliano Ridge, lying in the hills southeast of Savignano together with the important key village of San Martino (R 6692) to the
northeast of Sogliano, had paved the way for the Division to attack across the Fiumicino. The plan for 10th Indian Division, within the 5 Corps plan, was as follows: (1)
(a) Attack across the Fiumicino and capture Monte Farneto, key feature in the enemy’s defences in this sector.
(b) Capture the high ground San Lorenzo (R 6798) - Monte Gattona (R 6697) - Point 203 (R 6698), which lay across the river on the right sector of the divisional front.
(c) Continue the thrust forward of Monte Farneto and capture Monte Delle Vaccho
(R 5799) which dominated the River Savio.
(d) Be prepared from secure positions on high ground within divisional boundaries to attack northwards to free the front of 16th Division in the centre of the Corps front.
(a) Send a mobile force westwards from Strigara (R 6090) to protect the Corps left flank. 3. 'D' Day was fixed for the night 6/7 October, but owing to weather conditions this was postponed for twenty-four hours with the exception of Phase 1, which was successfully carried out as planned. The plan to cross the river called for a two brigade attack. The 25th Indian Infantry Brigade was to attack on the right to capture San Lorenzo. (R 6797) and the high ground, and also the village of Roncofreddo (R 65960 which lies to the southeast of the former village, also in a good defensive position The Brigade was to be supported in this attack by ‘C’ Squadron North Irish Horse. On the left 20th Indian Infantry Brigade was to attack across the river and capture Monte Farneto, supported by ‘B’ Squadron North Irish Horse.
The Capture of Monte Farneto and advance to the River Savio.
4. In preparation for the attack, both squadrons spent 6 October in reconnaissance of routes down to, and across, the river. ‘B’ Squadron was very fortunate in that the bridge over the Fiumicino at B 631928, about one and a quarter miles northwest of Sogliano, had not been blown and was usable to tanks. ‘C’ Squadron on the other hand, was not so fortunate and no suitable crossing could be found on their sector, with the result that the 5th Indian Infantry Brigade attack had to be postponed for twenty-four hours.
5. To achieve the capture of Monte Farneto, 20th Indian Infantry Brigade decided to attack with 2nd/3rd Gurkha Rifles right supported by two troops of tanks, and 3rd/5th Mahrattas on the left supported by the remaining two troops of tanks. 2nd/3rd Gurkha Rifles were timed to move forward at 2000 hours and 3rd/5th Mahrattas at 2130 hours on the night 6 October, the tanks to be in position to support them by first light 7 October.
6. At the times set, the infantry moved forward, and at 2300 hours the tanks of ‘B’ Squadron, plus three Shermans from the Regimental Reconnaissance Troop left harbour and moved throughout the night to Sogliano. One 0hurchill and one Sherman broke down on the way out, but the remainder carried on. Moving from Sogliano in the early hours of the morning the tanks resumed their advance towards their objective. The weather was cloudy and the tracks wet, and from 0438 hours to 0613 hours the enemy carried out persistent shelling.
7. By first light the tanks had crossed the river, but were held up by a blown bridge at R 631932. Extensive foot reconnaissance was then carried out by the Squadron Leader and Squadron Reconnaissance Officer in an endeavour to find a suitable route to the objective which had been reached by the 3rd/5th Mahrattas at 0530 hours. A track was subsequently found for the the troops supporting the Mahrattas, and they moved forward and tied up with the infantry on the objective. The two right hand troops were not quite so successful, and eventually had to use the same track as the two first troops, with the result that it was not until midday that they were able to contact the 2nd/3rd Gurkha Rifles on the feature.

(1) Map 10. The capture of M. dei Pino and H. Delle Vaccho and
      the breaching of the Chrisa II Line.

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