Page Thirty-five

8. The enemy, however, readily appreciating the threat to his defense system resulting from the loss of this important height, made a determined attempt to retake it. At 1400 hours, when 2nd/3rd Gurkha Rifles were deployed on the eastern slopes and 3rd/5th Mahrattas on the western slopes a strong and determined counter-attack was made by the enemy, but the tank crews of North Irish Horse made good use of their 75mm guns and machine guns, which, coupled with an effective heavy concentration of artillery, broke up the attack.

9. At 1830 hours, ‘B’ Squadron, still lying on Monte Farneto, suffered a serious loss when the Squadron Leader was wounded by a shell splinter when transferring from his tank to his Jeep. He was taken to the Infantry Regimental First Aid Post but died after admission and the Squadron Reconnaissance Officer took over temporary command of the squadron.

10. In view of the likelihood of further enemy counter-attacks against our newly won positions, it was considered inadvisable to withdraw the tanks to harbour and they therefore rallied back slightly behind the leading infantry companies, where they remaincd throughout the night. The heavy rain which had been falling most of the day added considerably to the difficulties of the supply position. It was impossible for the usual two-wheeled drive supply vehicles to reach the tanks by the rain sodden tracks and the problem was eventually solved by concentrating all available Jeeps and trailers, and bringing the necessary food, ammunition and petrol to the tanks by means of these invaluable vehicles.

11, As this action was taking place, ‘C’ Squadron on the right had carried on with the task of reconnoitering for suitable crossing places over the river. The officers doing this job were provided with infantry escort, but invariably found themselves alone as their dusky escorts glided off on a more exciting, and usually profitable mission of their own. A suitable crossing was eventually fonnd in the area H 6796, due east of Roncofreddo, and preparation proceeded for the 25th Indian Infantry Brigade attack during the night 7/8 October.

12. In the meantime ‘A’ Squadron, which was affiliated to 10th Indian Brigade was not actively engaged, but carried out the necessary important liaison with the infantry with whom they were going to cooperate in the near future. In accordance with divisional requirements to supply a mobile force for left flank protection, No.4 Troop of this Squadron was ordered to prepare to move and support Central Indian Horse, the reconnaissance unit under command of the Division, which had been given this task. The tanks of No 4 Troop therefore left harbour at 0300 hours 8 October and proceeded to Strigara (R 6091).

13. The night 7/8 October proceeded to be a more or less sleepless one for the tank crews of ‘B’ Squadron on Monte Farneto, as enemy patrols were active throughout the night endeavouring to infiltrate through the infantry positions, and although firing ensued, no penetrations were made. The crews repeatedly ‘stood to’ during the night, but at first light they once more took up their positions in close support of the infantry, remaining in this static counter-attack role throughout the rest of the day. From their positions they were able to give valuable support to 2nd/4th Gurkha Rifles who were directed on San Paolo (H 6395), a village lying between Monte Farneto and Roncofreddo to the northeast. The enemy stubbornly defended this village and although the Gurkhas managed to reach the outskirts, they were unable to clear it. The tanks, however, used their high explosive guns and machine guns to good effect, firing on selected targets.

11. It was now the turn of C’ Squadron to become actively engaged, and at 0300 hours 8 October the tanks moved out of harbour to support 25th Indian Infantry Brigade attack, which had been entrusted to 3rd/1st Punjabs and 3rd/18th Royal Garwhal Rifles, with the immediate objectives of San Lorenzo and the spur of high ground running northeast from Roncofreddo village. The infantry took the objectives by midday against light opposition but when the tanks came to the selected crossing at H 677967, they found that the heavy rain during the night had so swollen the river that it was almost practically impassable. With the never-say-die-spirit of the Irish, however, the crossing was attempted and by 0700 hours several tanks had crossed, but found on reaching the far side that they were unable to climb the bank and they subsequently became bogged. Every endeavour was made by the tank crews to keep the tanks going to try and get them out, but the task proved too great, and at the end of the day they were still in and around the river crossing where they had to remain. On the following day the river rose still further and flooded the adjacent countryside, to add still greater discomfort to the tank crews who were beginning to wonder if they were engaged in Combined Operations. One tank was fully submerged and had to be 'written off'.

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