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The Crossing of the Metauro River

11. The enemy had withdrawn behind the Metauro by 23 August, and twelve miles north of this river line ran the Poglia river upon which was based the defences of the Gothic line. Few troops were available to the Germans to man these prepared positions and it was essential that a breach should be made before reserves could be brought from other sectors. (1)

Planning

12. The attack was to be made with one infantry brigade up, the 128th Infantry Brigade supported by the North Irish Horse, along the right hand axis of the divisional front with Monte Bartolo (0365) as their immediate objective. It was emphasised that the attack must be pressed home by violent infantry and tank action during the day and continued by fresh infantry pressing forward during the night. The 46th Reconnaissance Regiment with in support ‘A’ Squadron the 51st Royal Tank Regiment were to provide left flank protection.

13. The 139th Infantry Brigade with in support the 51st Royal Tank Regiment (less ‘A’ Squadron) were to move up behind the 6th Reconnaissance Regiment and to be prepared to take over their commitments the moment they met sufficiently strong opposition to cause a delay in the advance.

14. In order to exercise more control in communications Main Brigade Headquarters moved forward to the area. 095529, opening up in the new location at 0330 hours 26 August.

The Attack

15. The 128th Infantry Brigade decided to advance on a one battalion front with one Squadron of the North Irish Horse in support, and at 2330 hours 25 August the 2nd Hampshires supported by ‘A’ Squadron, crossed the Metauro without meeting any opposition. The tanks concentrated in the area Fratte Rosa (114498) and moved off at the same time as the infantry on their approach to the river, intending to cross at 0400 hours on 26 August. The tanks reached the river without incident but found that the approaches would not bear the weight of the 40-ton Churchills, and consequently fresh crossing places had to be found. This was successfully accomplished and tha tanks joined up with the 2nd Hampshires at Monte Felcino (0661) by 0620 hours, representing an advance from the river of two miles and a climb of six hundred feet. The immediate problem of the tanks was now to find a crossing over the wadi running from 102600 to 017635. Foot reconnaissance was carried out but it was 1730 hours before a suitable crossing was discovered at 049633. It was then too late for the infantry to reach this flank to attack with tanks so it was planned that 1st/4th Hampshires should attack Monte Bartolo (0365) while the 5th Hampshires swung left to take Monte Guidoccio (0164) and Monte Grosso (0064). At dawn on 27 August the 2nd Hampshires were pushed through the 1st/4th Hampshires with Monte Gaudio (0268) as their objective.

16. On the left the 46th Reconnaissance Regiment crossed the Metauro at first light to be followed by ‘A‘ Squadron 51st Royal Tanks the latter crossing in the area 0655 and harbouring up in the area 0660. This squadron was not employed during the day and at last light a reconnaissance was carried out to find a crossing over the deep valley running southwest of Isola del Piano (0161). On the afternoon of 26 August it was decided to commit the 139th Infantry Brigade on the left axis of the 46th Division’s front, the 46th Reconnaissance Regiment coming under command. This meant that the division was now advancing on a two brigade front.

17. The night operations of the 128th Infantry Brigade were successful and at dawn ‘B’ Squadron North Irish Horse crossed the wadi and supported the 1st/4th Hampshires from the lower slopes of Monte Bartolo. Several houses in the area 0364 were still giving trouble to the infantry but the fire from the guns of the tanks effectively silenced them. The 2nd Hampshires had passed through and reached the road junction a mile and a half south of Monte Caudio (012659) and consequently ‘A’ Squadron North Irish Horse moved forward to support them. It was hoped to keep this squadron on the high ground so that the tank guns could give effective covering fire to the infantry and quickly engage any target proving troublesome to the advance, but the going was slow and one troop was detached to move along the road with the infantry. This troop, No 3, successfully negotiated two craters in the road but was eventually held up by a large blow at 031653. The remainder of the squadron were still finding the going in the hills heavy and slow for the tanks, and Lieutenant Colonel Lord O’Neill accordingly ordered them down on to the road. A bulldozer was rushed up and three more blows were filled in before the squadron could reach the road junction.

18. The 2nd Hampshires were held up by enemy holding the foothills of Monte Albullo an awkward feature which rose to a height of one thousand five hundred feet. A quick plan was made; ‘A’ Squadron North Irish Horse shot up the whole area with their main tank guns and machine guns enabling the infantry to claim its capture at 2230 hours. On the left the 2nd/5th Leicesters with ‘A’ Squadron 51st Royal Tanks in support were ordered to advance and capture Monte Tomba (9962). The first plan in which one company of infantry attacked with the support of two troops of tanks, failed mainly because of the difficulty of crossing the wadi previously mentioned at Isola del Piano, and the infantry had a very unpleasant time in the low ground between Monte Crosso and Monte Brardo (9960), where they were shelled and heavily mortared. The tanks however from their forward positions were able to give fire support to the infantry and many machine gun targets were engaged.

(1) Map 2: 5 Corps advance to the Gothic Line August 1944. (Not available)

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