1. The 4th British Division had now relieved the 46th Division in the area of Cesena and closed up to the river preparatory to making a crossing. The 12th Infantry Brigade was the first brigade being responsible for the area of Cesena, and on the night of 19/20 October
the 2nd Royal Fusiliers had crossed the river by wading as all bridges had been blown, and had formed a small bridgehead. A plan was made for the 12th Infantry Brigade, who had the support of the 142nd Regiment Royal Armoured Corps to enlarge the bridgehead so that the 10th Infantry Brigade could pass through and continue the advance, and also to enable the Savio to be spanned by a Bailey bridge. The plan made was as follows:-
2. To implement this attack ‘C’ Squadron of the 142nd. Regiment Royal Armoured Corps was to support the 6th Black Watch on the axis of Route 9 directed on Torre do Moro (5707) and Diegaro (M 5509) and ‘A’ Squadron was to support the Royal West Kennts on the axis west from 586065 - San Mauro in Valle and then northwest to Collo Purgatorio (5407 ) - track to Trantola. When the high ground running south from Diegaro to Massa (5407) had been cleared by the 12th Infantry Brigade, the 10th Infantry Brigade with the 51st Royal Tanks in support would then pass through and maintain the advance. On the night of 19/20 October reconnaissance had been carried out by personnel from the 142nd Regimont Royal Armoured Corps who accompanied Infantry patrols to the river. Reports en the various crossings which were reconnoiterd that night were as follows:-
(a) The Bridge at 587064
The approach road running from the area of the Castle in Cesena to the bridge was successfully blocked by a double blow at 590065. Apart from this the approach road was wide and in good order. Bridge itself was of the humped back variety and blown on the enemy side of the apex of the hump. It was difficult to ascertain the extent of the damage caused by the blow owing to the presence of booby traps on the bridge.
(b) River Crossing at 574037
At this point the width of the river was around twenty yards and the depth at the centre not more than eighteen inches, but running rather fast. Bed of the river was shingle, fairly solid but likely to rut easily with tanks and turning, as track to the river did not lead directly on to the crossing. There was six feet of sandy .
mud on either side of the shingle. The river banks, except for the
track, were about six feet high and sheer, but for obvious reasons it was not possible to give accurate information regarding the west bank, but the impression gained was that it was the same as the east side, and that an entrance could be made. The track leading to the crossing was just about wide enough to take a Churchill tank, but the ruts on either side may be liable to cause track trouble unless worked upon, and at many places a broken down tank could only be passed with difficulty. Some of the ground at the side was soft and some ploughed. The track led about two hundred yards to the river bed when the tanks would have to run on to the sandy mud for about twenty feet or so until they could turn on to the hard shingle of the crossing. Royal Engineer personnel who had also accompanied the patrol estimated that the time needed to make the crossing workable was not less that five hours provided that the necessary equipment was readily available, and then the crossing would have to be used very conservatively. Although high reeds gave some cover on the near banks, the whole crossing was in full view from the far banks and ridge. The nature of the track hid clues as to possible mining, but no old mines were seen near. During the reconnaissance, no trouble was met except for machine gun fire from the far banks to the right and left of the patrol.
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(c) River Crossing at 569032
Approach to this crossing was quite good, but mines were scattered and places dug in the track for them. The country round the crossing was close and the river banks well covered with reeds. Where the track ran down to the river the banks sloped down, ending in a drop of two feet six inches where the fast flowing river had cut the banks away. At this point the river was approximately eighty foot wide and during that night 3 - 4 feet deep, with the flow estimated at five feet per second, The banks and river bed were soft and sandy and the crossing was not suitable for tanks at the moment, although it would probably be suitable after a period of three or four days without rain. The river was not crossed but the west bank appeared to be the same as the east one. The mines encountered were Riegel mines.
(d) River Crossing at 575050
The patrol was unable to reach the river at this point.
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(e) River Crossing at 580047
The road. approaches were found to be impassable with a
canal on the east side of the river and no further reconnaissance was
carried out.
(f) River Crossing at 586060
The river banks on the east side were about ten feet high. The approach to the actual river from the banks was about sixty - seventy feet wide, but with sandy soil and not suitable for Churchills. The approximate width of the river was eighty feet, and although fording may have been possible the river bed was not too solid. The west bank appeared to be the same as the east bank, but slightly steeper, and the report of the Royal Engineer officer was most unsuitable, stating that a hundred and eighty foot Bailey would be required to bridge this point, and generally not a suitable crossing.