World War Two - North Irish Horse Battle Reports

Page 10

The 12th April was a quiet day for the tanks until the afternoon, when a message was received that the Black Watch, in trying to change over a forward Company which had been heavily shelled, with a rear Company, had taken the forward Company off before putting the rear Company on, with the result that enemy fire prevented the re-occupation of the forward locality. Two Troops of tanks were sent out to support the infantry but were not used and a platoon making a counter-attack after dark failed to re-establish the position which had been occupied by the enemy after last light.

Owing to the failure of the Black Watch to re-establish the forward locality I was sent for during the night 12th-13th April and with the Gunner made a plan for a composite Squadron of A and B Squadrons, under the command of Major Russell, to support the Black Watch on to the forward objective. This was achieved soon after first light. During the course of this day and Hamps went forward on to Djebel El Guerinat which had not been re-occupied after 38th Brigade had been pulled out. This advance was not contested by the enemy.

During the morning Capt. Leslie, our E.M.E. and Lieut. Ball, Technical Adjutant, arrived at Oued Zarga to supervise repair work at the new workshop which had just been set up there. They had only been there a few minutes when enemy aircraft attacked and Capt. Leslie was killed and Lieut. Ball wounded. This was a very severe loss to the Regiment and necessitated the appointment of Lieut. Garner, who was Recovery Officer, as E.M.E. and Lieut. Wilson, who was commanding R.H.Q. Troop, as Technical Adjutant.

In the afternoon a plan to put a Company of the Black Watch on to the 350 feature was abandoned as it was felt that it was wiser to leave this bare feature unoccupied and to include it in the defensive fire tasks. The tanks, however, remained in the area until last light when they withdrew to harbour near the Oued Bouneb.

On 14th April the Regiment moved to a harbour just to the south of Oued Zarga Where it was joined by No. 5 Troop C Squadron, and where we prepared for the last \ phase of the campaign. We soon heard to our intense satisfaction that we were to come under command of 78th Division who at this time were having some very hard fighting.. This resulted in the capture of the Chaouach and Toukabeur but not of Tanngoucha or Heidous, each of which proved the scene of violent attack and counter- attack.

On 19th April, Major-General Evelegh unfolded the plan to the brigadiers and Lt. Col. Dawnay. The next day it was explained in greater detail to Company and equivalent commanders on a cloth model and the Army Commander spoke to the assembled officers. The Regiment had the good fortune once again to come under command of 36th Infantry Brigade, which was given the important role of the capture of Longstop. By 1200 hours, 22nd April, reconnaissance and conferences had been completed and we were ready for the tasks ahead. The following report of the battle for Longstop is based on the report submitted by Commander 36th Infantry Brigade to 78th Division:

The battle of Longstop started at 2245 hours, 22nd April, when the 6th Royal West Kents and 5th Buffs left their start line to the east and west of Chassart Teffaha. Their objectives were: 6th R.W.K. - Chaibine and the ridge to the north. 5th Buffs - Djebel Bechtab, Point 196 and Point 303. 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were in reserve ready to pass through the forward battalions on to Longstop, with the object of securing Djebel Rhar before daybreak, 1st Surreys, from 9th Infantry Brigade, under command 36th Infantry Brigade for this battle, with N.I.H. in support, were prepared to exploit along the road east of Longstop. N.I.H. left their harbour at Oued Zarga at 1930 hours and proceeded along the road Medjez-Oued Zarga. All went well until near Medjez 2nd Lieut. Perioli's tank went up on a deeply laid mine over which many tanks had already passed. Fortunately the track did not break although six bogies were shattered and the tank was able to move to the side of the road. After this the Regiment could only move very slowly and owing to mines had to alter the route to Chassart Teffaha. The speed of advance gradually got slower and slower and stops became more frequent while mines and vehicles of 1st Recon­naissance Regiment, which blocked the road, were being removed. It was only with very great difficulty that N.I.H. reached their assembly area by first light. Everybody, however, was very much heartened by the tremendous artillery fire during the early hours of the morning.

By 0530 hours, 23rd April, 5th Buffs reached their objectives but heavy machine-gun fire prevented 6th R.W.K. from going beyond Chaibine, making it impossible for 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders to carry out their original plan before dawn. It was not until 0800 hours that 6th R.W.K. were able to reach both objectives after B and C Squadrons N.I.H. had been sent forward to occupy the Chaibine, where they dealt with machine-gun nests and were then accurately shelled and mortared. Early on 23rd April the Brigadier, with Lt. Cols. Thomas and Dawnay, went forward to make a new plan which was for 8th A. & S.H. followed by 1st Surreys with N.I.H. in support to assault Djebel Ahmera, the western feature of Long-stop. At 1330 hours after heavy artillery concentration the assault started. The 8th A. & S.H. went up the hill with great dash through heavy machine-gun fire. Casualties were heavy, including the Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. McNab, the I.O., Capt. Erskine, and the Adjutant, Lieut. McLeish, killed. By 1530 hours after going in with the bayonet, the Argylls captured the hill. Meanwhile “A" Squadron N.I.H. worked round towards Point 196 destroying en route a machine-gun which had held up 1st Surreys. One tank of 5th Troop crossed the wadi and contacted 5th Buffs, eventually reaching a spot from which the commander dominated the valley and Point 196, and from where, despite heavy shell fire, he managed to shoot up certain positions indicated by the Buffs. B and C Squadrons supported the attack from the right flank near Chaibine. By the Evening Djebel Ahmera was held by the 8th A. & S.H. and 1st Surreys, both battalions being very much under strength, and by 6th R.W.K., who had moved forward in support, the whole force being under the command of Lt. Col. Wilberforce, D.S.O., 1st Surreys. In order to protect the right flank and the road running South of Chaibine, a com­posite force composed largely of H.Q. Company personnel from 1st Surreys and 6th R.W.K., a section of Brigade Defence Platoon and anti-tank guns from 2561th Battery, under command of Capt. Stewart 6th R.W.K., took up a position on ridge south of Chaibine. This force remained in position until the brigade was relieved by 9th Infantry Brigade. During the night an attempt by 6th R.W.K. to capture Djebel Rhar failed owing to heavy mortar fire on the forming up point.

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