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   On the morning of 24th April a composite Squadron N.I.H., with R.H Q Troop to help with covering fire was assembled on the southern slopes of Longstop to support the infantry - they.remained there to take part at mid-day in an operation by 1st Surreys to clear Mosque Ridge, and by 6th R.W.K. to capture Djebel Rhar the eastern feature of Longstop. Intense mortar and machine-gun fire was put down on the infantry as soon as they attempted to advance, the fire from Djebel Rhar being such that it was impossible for 6th R.W.K. to advance. A very small party of 1st Surreys and R.Es. was able to reach the ridge after it had been cleared by the tanks, one of which was damaged by a mine outside the main minefield running down to the road. This tank was successfully evacuated by Capt. Griffith under machine-gun fire. Another tank was brought up, personal weapons were got out and the crew very cleverly transferred to the supporting tank. Just before dark the tanks withdrew from the ridge, the damaged one being protected by infantry patrols.
    During the morning a warning was received from an intercept that the enemy might counter attack Point 196 held by a Company of 5th Buffs. This attack did not materialize but two Troops of tanks were sent to support the Buffs in case of trouble. Through-out the night 24th/25th April two Troops remained on the southern slopes of Djebel Ahmera.br

   During 25th April the Boche had shown signs of withdrawing in front of 38th Infantry Brigade on our left, so it was considered possible that Djebel Rhar might be abandoned during the night. A reconnaissance patrol sent out by 6th R.W.K. to confirm whether this was so was soon very forcibly shown by machine-gun fire that the Boche was still in occupation of the position.
   The plan for the capture of Djebel Rhar, which was based on most accurate information obtained by reconnaissance patrols from 6th R.W.K. during the night, consisted of a diversion round the right flank from Mosque Ridge by C Squadron N.I.H. and a strong fighting patrol from 8th A. & S.H. followed by the main assault by 5th Buffs supported by N.I.H. less C Squadron from the left flank. The Brigadier went forward to fight the battle from Lt. Col. Dawnay's tank.
   The attack started at 0830 hours on 26th April, the Boche bringing down the usual heavy mortar fire which delayed the advance of the Argyll patrol, but the C Squadron tanks pushed on to the ridge north-east of Mosque Ridge from which the forward ob­servation officer had very good shooting throughout the day. Later the Argylls worked their way forward and cleaned up a number of snipers in the gulleys, capturing about a dozen pris­oners. This diversion was most successful as it had the effect of pushing the Boche into the arms of the main attacking force on the other flank and also prevented any withdrawal to the north­east.
   On the left the 5th Buffs formed up near Point 196 at 0830 hours with B Squadron N.I.H. in front. Boche shelling began before 5th Buffs started to advance, but soon after 0900 hours the battalion moved forward with A Company on the right, D Company on the left, B Company in reserve, and B Squadron N.I.H. in support. The infantry advanced along the upper slopes, with the tanks pursuing a parallel course on the lower slopes of Djebel Ahmera. As the advance progressed two Troops of tanks worked forward. No. 4 Troop on the right silenced a machine-gun post in a re-entrant and then, after Lieut. Brownfield Pope had transferred to another tank owing to his own breaking a track, went on to engage two machine-gun posts, which surrendered. Immediately the Buffs appeared on the north-west slopes of Longstop the battalion was heavily and accurately shelled by infantry, self-propelled and medium guns. At times whole platoons were hidden by bursting shells but they pressed on with magnificent spirit as though taking part in peace­time maneouvres. A machine-gun post then threatened to hold up the advance but immediate action by No. 4 Troop silenced it and Sjt. O'Hare, climbing high on the southern side of Point 289, dealt with three more such posts. Major Russell, com­manding B Squadron, then ordered No. 4 Troop to proceed round to the west of the Rhar to find a way up. At the head of the saddle between the Ahmera and Rhar, Lieut. Pope encountered another machine-gun and mortar post and, finally, a 75 mm. gun badly sited to fire down the western re-entrant, after one round of 6-pounder H.E. and a burst of Besa the crew surrendered. Sjt. O'Hare then tackled the ascent and on reaching the summit after a magnificent climb took over 50 prisoners. Lieut. Pope meantime was working round the western side of the Rhar. Sjt. O'Hare then moved on down the northern slope, shepherding the prisoners along with him.
   The forward companies of the Buffs now moved on to their objectives and B Company moved up in support of A Company. As they moved on to Point 243 and the feature to the left of it, A and D companies received the surrender of an embarrassing number of prisoners, including the C.O. of 111-754 Grenadier Regiment and his four Company ommanders. On the left, Major Russell aided by Lieut. Pyl and Lieut. Brown, each of whose Troops were now reduced to a single tank, moved on to a spur to cover the northern side of the Rhar plain from Rhar to Sidi Ahmed, thus preventing the Boche withdrawing. It is very unlikely that any of the Longstop garrison escaped. Whilst re-grouping on the spur, the Squadron was accurately shelled by a heavy gun but No. 2 Troop leader spotted the flashes and was able to get the artillery on toil. Unfortunately the F.O.O. was killed whilst directing his guns. The Buffs consolidated on Djebel Rhar, adapting the existing Boche defences and blasting new positions with " Beehives." Whilst the Buffs were consoli­dating, A Squadron 56th Reconnaissance Regiment moved up the road from Chassart Teffaha towards the forward position of C Squadron N.I.H. where the Squadron commander was able to indicate to the Reconnaissance Squadron some enemy still holding out. These were rounded up, four being killed and about 30 captured. On Longstop over 300 prisoners were taken at a cost to the Buffs of 40 casualties. Throughout the operations from 22nd to 26th April detachments of sappers from 256th Field Company did excellent work with the infantry, tanks and reconnaissance Squadron, lifting mines and supervising the blowing of positions with "Beehives" Very fine work was done by 217th Field Ambulance evacuating casualties, and the speed with which this was carried out was greatly accelerated by the use of a pro­portion of carriers from each battalion.    The final operations, resulting in the capture of Djebel Rhar, were an example of perfect co-operation between all arms, particularly between tanks and infantry. Targets were success­fully indicated to the tanks by means of verey lights fired at machine-gun posts, and in one case a 75 mm. gun was dealt with in this manner. The method by which the tanks moved in echelon along the hillside with those higher up moving ahead of those in the valley enabled anti-tank guns to be engaged before they were able to fire on the tanks in the valley.
   It is impossible to speak too highly of the support given by N.I.H. or of the steady advance of the Buffs under heavy shell-fire, two factors which made the capture of Djebel Rhar possible.
   In the prisoner of war cage the German battalion commander who was responsible for the defence of Longstop, on being questioned about his defences made the following statement: " The Djebel Rhar is one of the strongest defensive positions that one could ever hope to occupy. I would have been prepared to hold it against a full scale British infantry brigade attack. When it was apparent that tanks were being used over the high ground I knew that all was over." Another German officer is reported to have stated: "When information was first received that tanks were being used on the high ground at Longstop it was not believed by the officers."

Report on action by 1st Troop A Squadron, under Capt. R. H. Bowring, during period 23rd-26th April is given as an Appendix to this section.

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