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On 15th June orders were received from 25th Army Tank Brigade that a composite force comprising all Shermans was to come under command of the 8th Indian Division. A composite Squadron was formed under Major P. Welch, M.C., and together with the reconnaissance Troop, carried out a three-day approach march involving a journey of one hundred and thirty-eight miles. On the 18th June this force reached Bastia and found the enemy were about five miles away and withdrawing under pressure.
18th June - Two Troops under Lieut. J. Rogers and Lieut. D. Hunt respectively, advanced in support of the 6th Indian Lancers towards the village of Ripa. It was thought that the enemy would have evacuated this place during the night but on reaching the western approaches it was found to be held. Lieut. Roger's Troop lost two tanks but Lieut. Hunt's Troop in supporting an infantry attack on Ripa had a good shoot and inflicted casualties on the enemy. Later on this day Lieut. Hubbard's Troop supported a Company of infantry on to Palazzo, a ridge with a large house on it.
20th June - Two Troops under Lieut. H. E. Irwin, M.C., and Lieut. P. A. Garstin respectively, supported two companies of the 1st-12th Frontier Force Regiment on to two ridges. Zero for this attack was at 1830 hours. The attack was preceded by a barrage and smoke programme. The smoke programme proved to be too heavy and both Troops found difficulty in contacting their infantry. However, with the help of an Infantry Liaison Officer this was achieved and by last light the Troops had put their companies on to the objectives. The Commanding Officer of the 1st-12th Frontier Force Regiment arranged with Major Welch to go forward to the second objective at 0500 hours the next day to reconnoitre for an attack across the Grande River on to a feature called Colombella.
21st June - At first light both Lieut. Irwin and Lieut. Garstin rang up to say that their companies wished to carry out mopping up operations to the north of their positions. Plans for this were made and soon put into force. Major Welch rang up Lieut. Irwin to find out how he was getting on and was told, "The place is full of Germans running around in circles, I never saw so many." He was told to deal with them, which he did effectively, killing between thirty and forty and taking six prisoners. Lieut. Garstin also had a good shoot and knocked out two machine-gun posts.
At 1100 hours the Brigade Commander of the 17th Indian Brigade under whom the Regiment was working, now decided to change the axis of advance to a road further east, the original intention having been to advance up a road which clung to the left bank of the Tiber. He asked for the remainder of the Squadron to be prepared to attack with the 1st Battalion Royal Fusiliers. Major Welch started making plans with the Commanding Officer of the Royal Fusiliers. At 1500 hours the brigade commander informed the Commanding Officer, N.I.H., that ammunition for the guns was in short supply. In view of this the Commanding Officer suggested that the attack be put off to the next day when it would be possible to withdraw the two Troops who were under command of the 1st-12th Frontier Force Regiment and support the Royal Fusiliers' attack with the whole composite Squadron The Brigade Commander readily agreed.
The Commanding Officer took the opportunity of this lull to relieve Major Welch who had been on the go for some time and Major W. M. Mackean, M.C., was placed in command of the composite Squadron. The plan of attack was now re-made on the basis of having the whole Squadron. At last light Lieut. Irwin's and Lieut. Garstin's Troops withdrew, having been in their tanks for twenty-six hours and having done excellent work.
22nd June - A co-ordinating conference was to be held with the Brigade Commander at 1100 hours but at this conference it was notified that the Divisional Commander had decided to postpone the attack. We were most disappointed to hear this as we all felt very confident of success. News had been received that the 3rd Hussars were to relieve N.I.H. and the Divisional Commander felt that with a whole regiment of armour he could carry out a deeper penetration than with a composite squadron.
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